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Since people with low status are more likely to experience social evaluative threat and are therefore more inclined to monitor for
these threats and inhibit approach behaviour, we expected that low-status subjects would be more engaged in evaluating their
own performance, compared with high-status subjects. We created a highly salient social hierarchy based on the performance of
a simple time estimation task. Subjects could achieve high, middle or low status while performing this task simultaneously with
other two players who were either higher or lower in status. Subjects received feedback on their own performance, as well as on
the performance of the other two players simultaneously. Electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded from all three participants.
The results showed that medial frontal negativity (an event-related potential reflecting performance evaluation) was significantly
enhanced for low-status subjects. Implications for status-related differences in goal-directed behaviour are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Social hierarchies feature prominently in a large variety of
animal species (Boehm, 1999), including humans, and are
found to be an important organizing principle in most cul-
tures (Sidanius and Pratto, 2001). In animals, but also in
humans, social status strongly predicts well-being, morbidity
and even survival (Sapolsky, 2004). Be it in domestic, pro-
fessional or recreational settings, status looms large and de-
fines implicit expectations and action predispositions that
drive appropriate (social) behaviour (Cummins, 2000).
Recent work by social scientists has begun to tackle this
topic, elucidating behavioural differences between low- and
high-status individuals. More specifically, this line of re-
search has focused on the effects of social power. Although
power and status are conceptually different, they almost
always go hand in hand, which is why we will use these
terms interchangeably here.
One of the more prominent theories in this field holds that
high status and power are associated with approach behav-
iour, while low power is related to inhibitory behaviour
(Keltner et al., 2003). Perspectives on approach and inhibition
behaviour have been shaped to a large extent by the theory
postulated by Gray (1987) that proposes two interacting mo-
tivational systems: the behavioural approach system (BAS)
and the behavioural inhibition system (BIS). While the BAS
regulates behaviour associated with rewards, such as the ac-
quisition of food, sex and money, the BIS acts as an alarm
system that is triggered by signals of potential punishment
and inhibits behaviour that may lead to aversive or harmful
outcomes. Although research has largely focused on individ-
ual (trait) differences in approach and inhibition (e.g. Carver
and White, 1994), Keltner and colleagues (2003) proposed
that social status can also influence the relative balance be-
tween approach and inhibition. Their theory states that high
power activates approach-related processes, while low power
activates inhibitory processes. The reason for this, they pro-
pose, is that power is associated with optimal access to re-
wards. Powerful people more often than not find themselves
in environments offering many potential rewards, making it
easier for them to approach these rewards. In addition, the
powerful are less dependent on others to acquire these re-
wards, making it easier for those with high status to act in
ways that enable them to obtain rewards. For complementary
reasons, those with low status are more inclined to inhibit
approach behaviour. These low-status individuals lack
access to material and social resources and experience more
social threat and punishments, especially the threat of being
evaluated unfavourably by those having higher status. Because
the environment of people with low status is characterized by
a high degree of threat and limited access to rewards, they are
more inclined to inhibit reward-seeking approach behaviour.
In support of this theory, we have previously shown that the
experience of power directly activates the motivational
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systems in the brain that regulate approach behaviour
(Boksem et al., 2011c). High-status subjects showed a greater
relative activation of left frontal–cortical areas, which have
been specifically related to approach behaviour (e.g.
Harmon-Jones, 2003), and have been associated with a stron-
ger bias to respond to reward related cues (Pizzagalli et al.,
2005).
Together, these findings suggest that social status has a
profound effect on how people monitor their environment
and evaluate their own performance: while high-status sub-
jects are more focused on (rewarding) outcomes, low-status
subjects are more inclined to evaluate outcomes in terms of
potential (social) threat and losses.
This evaluation of performance is reflected by a family of
negative-going event-related potentials (ERPs) that are
elicited both when subjects commit errors [error-related
negativity (ERN); Falkenstein et al., 1990], as well as when
subjects receive negative performance feedback [feedback-
related negativity (FRN); Miltner et al., 1997]. These ERP
components have been suggested to be associated with
common underlying neural processes (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2004), and for convenience, we will refer to these compo-
nents as medial frontal negativity (MFN; Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002). We have previously found (Boksem
et al., 2006, 2008) that, while subjects with high
BAS-scores displayed a large MFN in the context of potential
rewards that could be earned, subjects with high BIS-scores
displayed a large MFN in the context of potential losses.
Therefore, we proposed that the MFN reflects a motiv-
ational/affective evaluation of performance outcomes: the
MFN may reflect the subjective importance of action out-
comes for an individual (see also Gehring and Willoughby,
2002; Pailing and Segalowitz, 2004; Hajcak et al., 2005;
Yu et al., 2007; Tops and Boksem, 2010).
More specifically, we have argued that MFN amplitudes are
most dependent on how concerned subjects are over making
mistakes, especially in a social context. Indeed, both measures
of negative affectivity (i.e. anxiety, neuroticism) and positive
affectivity (i.e. agreeableness; Deneve and Cooper, 1998) have
been shown to affect MFN amplitude while they are also
related to concerns over social evaluation (e.g. Tops et al.,
2006). The most salient feedback signals are of a social
nature, and negative social evaluation is probably one of the
most potent ones, leading to strong physiological responses
(Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004). Indeed, the MFN, BIS and
cortisol levels have all been related to social evaluative threat
(Hajcak et al., 2005; Cavanagh and Allen, 2008; Tops and
Boksem, 2011). Importantly, the Anterior Cingulate Cortex
(ACC; the putative source of the MFN) has been shown to be
involved in processing ‘error’ signals from the social environ-
ment such as potential loss of social resources: exclusion, re-
jection and the experience of shame and guilt (Shin et al.,
2000; Eisenberger et al., 2003; Kross et al., 2007).
Since people with low status are more likely to experience
social evaluative threat (e.g. Fiske, 1993; Anderson and
Berdahl, 2002) and are consequently more inclined to
monitor for these threats and inhibit approach behaviour
(Keltner et al., 2003), we would expect that, particularly in
a hierarchical social context, low-status individuals will be
more engaged in evaluating their own performance (i.e. dis-
play a larger MFN), compared with high-status individuals.
This is what we set out to investigate in the present study.
METHOD
Thirty-six healthy participants (seven males), between 17
and 32 (M¼ 20.9, s.d.¼ 4.2) years of age, were recruited
from the university population. Subjects were invited to
the lab three at a time. Upon arrival, they were informed
that they were to play an interactive game with the other
participants present in the lab and that we would be record-
ing Electroencephalography (EEG) from all of them. To
make sure that differences in status were not confounded
with baseline differences in approach motivation [which
has been shown to be related to both MFN amplitudes and
social power (Boksem et al., 2006, 2011)], we administered
the BIS/BAS-scale developed by Carver and White (1994).
The social ranking we created was based on the perform-
ance in a simple time estimation reaction time task that
subjects performed individually (we will refer to this part
of the experiment as the ‘rank-inducing session’; see Zink
et al., 2008). At the start of each trial, a blue circle was pre-
sented that changed colour to green after 2–2.5 s. It was the
participants’ job to press the response button exactly 1 s after
the circle had turned green. Responses were considered cor-
rect when they were within a certain allowable time interval.
Subsequently, subjects received feedback on their perform-
ance: a smiley face when they responded within the allowable
time interval or a sad face when they responded too fast or
too slow. Over the 320 trials that subjects performed in this
rank-inducing session, we covertly adjusted the duration of
allowable-response interval based on a subject’s perform-
ance. If a response fell outside the allowable-response inter-
val, the interval was lengthened, while if a response fell
within the allowable-response interval, the interval was
shortened. For the subjects who were to become the
‘top-ranking’ players, the interval was lengthened by 30 ms
when responses fell outside the critical interval, and short-
ened by only 5 ms when responses fell within the interval.
For the subjects who were to become the ‘middle-ranking’
players, the interval was lengthened by 5 ms when responses
fell outside the critical interval, and shortened by 5 ms when
responses fell within the interval. Finally, for subjects who
were to become the ‘lowest-ranking’ players, the interval was
lengthened by 5 ms when responses fell outside the critical
interval, and shortened by 30 ms when responses fell within
the interval. After every 20 trials, summary feedback was
displayed (for 5 s), showing the cumulative percentage cor-
rect of all three players. The ranking of the participants was
based on this percentage correct. During the entire experi-
ment, the name of the player with the best score was
Social status and performance evaluation SCAN (2012) 305
 at R
adboud U
niversity on A
pril 12, 2012
http://scan.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
presented at the top of the screen, the name of the player
with the worst score at the bottom of the screen and the
third player in the middle, creating a hierarchical ranking.
The names presented were the actual names of the three
participants. To make this ranking even more salient, the
top player received three stars behind his name, the middle
player two and the bottom-ranking player received just one
star. Importantly, when the status of the subject changed,
both the position of their name on the screen, as well as
the number of stars behind their name changed. We made
sure that subjects achieved their final ranking at least 100
trials before the end of the rank-inducing session and that
they maintained this status until the end of the first session.
Twelve subjects acquired the low (two males), middle (two
males) and high (three males) rank.
After a short break, subjects continued with the second
session that we will refer to as the experimental session. In
this session, the three subjects performed the time estimation
task together and were informed that every correct response
from the three participants would be rewarded with five euro-
cents, so the maximal earnings per trail would be 15 euro-
cents. Every cent won would be added to an account that was
displayed on screen throughout the experiment. Subjects were
informed that at the end of the experiment, the money in the
account would be distributed equally among the three sub-
jects. Subjects received feedback on their own and also on the
others’ performance simultaneously, and were informed that
the other two subjects also received feedback on performance
of all three participants at the same time (Figure 1). Subjects
performed 320 trials in this session, lasting for 35 min. In
this second, experimental session the length of the critical
interval was manipulated in such a way that all subjects
received positive feedback on 50% of the trials. The hierarchy
established in the rank-inducing session was maintained so
the status of subjects did not change during the experimental
session, and was visible to the subjects during the entire ex-
periment (i.e. by the number of stars behind their names and
the position of their names on the screen (Figure 1). It is
important to note that, although the percentage of positive
and negative feedback was manipulated, this feedback was
actually still contingent upon the participants’ performance.
What differed between subjects was the time interval within
which responses were considered correct.
EEG was recorded from 128 locations using active
Ag–AgCl electrodes (Biosemi ActiveTwo, Amsterdam,
Netherlands) mounted in an elastic cap. Horizontal EOGs
were recorded from two electrodes placed at the outer canthi
of both eyes. Vertical EOGs were recorded from electrodes
on the infraorbital and supraorbital regions of the right eye
placed in line with the pupil. The EEG and EOG signals were
sampled at a rate of 256 Hz, digitally low-pass filtered with a
52 Hz cut-off (3 dB) and offline rereferenced to an averaged
mastoid reference.
All ERP analyses were performed using the Brain Vision
Analyser software (Brain Products). The data were
resampled at 100 Hz and further filtered with a 0.53 Hz
high-pass filter and a slope of 48 dB/oct and a 40 Hz low-pass
filter also with a slope of 48 dB/oct. Artefacts were rejected
and eye movement artefacts were corrected, using the
Gratton et al. (1983) method. ERPs from each individual
subject were averaged separately and a baseline voltage aver-
aged over the 200 ms interval preceding feedback was sub-
tracted from these averages.
Visual inspection of grand-averaged waveforms and their
scalp distributions (Figures 2–5) indicated an MFN that
reached its maximum between 220 and 320 ms after presen-
tation of the feedback on midline frontal electrode sites,
centred around FCz and Cz. Therefore, the average ampli-
tudes in this time window and these electrode positions were
entered in a general linear model (GLM) for statistical ana-
lyses To minimize the effects of differences between groups
resulting from non-neural causes and also to minimize the
effects of overlap between MFN and other ERP components
(most notably the P3), we followed up on these analyses by
creating difference waves by subtracting ERPs elicited by
wins from ERPs associated with losses (see Holroyd and
Krigolson, 2007) and submitted mean amplitudes of these
difference waves recorded from FCz, Cz and Pz in a time
window of 220–320 ms post-feedback to t-tests. To further
rule out potential contamination of the MFN by other po-
tentially overlapping components, we also analysed the ERP
data by conducting a spatial principal component analysis
(PCA; Spencer et al., 2001), using the PCA module provided
Fig. 1 Screenshot of the time estimation reaction time task. At the start of the trial,
a blue circle was presented, that changed colour to green after 2–2.5 s. It was the
participant’s job to hit the spacebar exactly 1 s after the circle had turned green.
Subjects were rewarded with five eurocents every time they responded correctly.
Responses were considered correct when they were within a certain critical time
interval. Two seconds after the circle changed colour, subjects were given feedback on
their performance: a smiley face accompanied by ‘þ5ct’ when they responded within
the critical time interval or a sad face and ‘þ0ct’ when they responded too fast or
too slow. Note that the name of the player with the best score was presented at the
top of the screen, the name of the player with the worst score at the bottom of the
screen and the third player in the middle, creating a hierarchical ranking. The names
presented were the actual names of the three participants. To make this ranking even
more salient, the top player received three stars behind his name, the middle player
two and the bottom-ranking player received just one star.
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with the Brain Vision Analyzer software. Spatial factor load-
ings were obtained by submitting to a PCA the datapoints
for each participant and condition, using varimax rotation
and taking an eigenvalue of 1 as the limit for the number of
components extracted. Next, we identiEed the factor show-
ing loadings that were maximal at frontal–central areas (see
Holroyd and Coles, 2008; Holroyd et al., 2008), enabling us
to isolate activity that can be attributed to the MFN. We
further analysed the extracted PCA components in the
same way as the ERPs, by submitting the average of a
220–320 ms time window to statistical analyses. Finally, we
correlated ERP and PCA data with BIS/BAS scores and per-
formance data.
RESULTS
BIS/BAS
In order to determine whether there were baseline differ-
ences in approach motivation between groups that could
potentially confound our results, subjects filled out the
Fig. 2 Feedback-locked ERPs, averaged over the three status groups (n¼ 36), showing that negative feedback elicited a more negative-going ERP in the latency range typically
associated with the MFN (here: 220–320 ms), compared with the ERP elicited by positive feedback. The dotted line represents the difference wave created by subtracting the ERP
associated with positive feedback from the ERP associated with negative feedback.
Fig. 3 Feedback-locked ERPs from subjects in the high (n¼ 12) and low (n¼ 12) status groups, showing a more pronounced difference in amplitude (220–320 ms) between
positive and negative feedback for low-status subjects, compared with high-status subjects.
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BIS/BAS questionnaire. Mean BIS scores for the low, middle
and high-status groups were 19.0 (s.d.¼ 4.3), 22.0
(s.d.¼ 3.9) and 19.8 (s.d.¼ 4.4), respectively, F(2, 35)¼
1.75, NS. Mean BAS scores were 43.3 (s.d.¼ 2.9), 40.8
(s.d.¼ 3.5) and 40.8 (s.d.¼ 5.6), respectively, F(2, 35)¼
1.36, NS. These results show that there were no significant
baseline differences in approach motivation between our
three status groups.
ERPs
While amplitudes were of comparable magnitude at Cz and
FCz, for reasons of clarity and consistency, we will report
results from Cz here. However, the reported effects were also
significant at FCz. As expected, feedback indicating losses
elicited a larger negativity (M¼ 2.5mV) in the MFN latency
range compared to feedback indicating gains [M¼ 5.3mV,
F(1, 33)¼ 72.93, P< 0.001; see Figure 2]. One sample
t-tests confirmed that the amplitude of the difference wave
(M¼2.7mV), created by subtracting the ERPs associated
with gains from the ERPs associated with losses, was indeed
significantly different from zero, t(35)¼8.64, P< 0.001
(Figure 2). This was shown to be true for the MFN in the
low-status group [M¼3.3 mV, t(11)¼6.77, P< 0.001],
as well as in the middle-status group [M¼2.6mV,
t(11)¼6.24, P< 0.001], and also in the high-status group
[M¼2.6 mV, t(11)¼3.85, P< 0.005]. Figure 5 shows
that, in accordance with previous studies reporting MFN,
this negativity reached its maximum over frontocentral
scalp positions in all three status groups.
Fig. 4 Difference waves, created by subtracting the feedback-evoked ERP associated with positive feedback from the ERP associated with negative feedback, for subjects with low
(n¼ 12), middle (n¼ 12) and high (n¼ 12) status. MFN was significantly larger for low-status subjects compared with subjects of both middle and high status.
Fig. 5 Topographical distributions of the MFN for the three status groups.
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In addition, we found an interaction between outcome
(gains vs losses) and status, F(2, 33)¼ 4.46, P< 0.05
(Figures 3 and 4). To follow-up on this, we tested for dif-
ferences in MFN amplitude associated with social status by
submitting difference waves for the three status levels (high,
middle and low status) to independent samples t-tests. We
found that the MFN amplitude on Cz associated with low
status was larger compared with the MFN associated with
high status, t(33)¼ 1.95, P< 0.05, and was also larger com-
pared with the MFN associated with middle status,
t(33)¼ 2.02, P< 0.05. The MFNs associated with high
and middle status were not significantly different,
t(33)¼ 0.09, NS.
PCA
To conErm our Endings, and to separate activity that can be
attributed to the MFN from activity that cannot, we con-
ducted a spatial PCA on the ERP data. This analysis revealed
three spatial components that were maximal at AFz, Cz and
POz/PO8, respectively. Although slightly more posterior
than the MFN, we selected the second spatial factor, which
was maximal at Cz, as the best representative of the MFN
(Figure 6A). Comparable with the ERP findings, this PCA
component was more negative for losses compared with
wins [F(1, 33)¼ 45.67, P< 0.001], and this effect interacted
with social status [F(2, 33)¼ 5.18, P< 0.05; Figure 6B].
Follow-up analyses, using difference waves that were created
by subtracting factor loadings associated with gains from
those associated with losses (analogue to ERP difference
waves; Figure 6C), showed that factor loadings of this com-
ponent associated with low status were larger compared with
those associated with high status, t(33)¼ 2.57, P< 0.05, and
were also larger compared with those associated with middle
status, t(33)¼ 3.03, P< 0.05. Loadings associated with high
and middle status were not significantly different,
t(33)¼ 0.41, NS. Finally, none of the effects reported above
were significant when we analysed components 1 and 3,
showing that component 2 uniquely contributed to the
effect of social status on MFN amplitude.
Correlations
For low-status subjects, MFN difference wave amplitudes on
Cz were found to be related to the length of the critical
interval in which responses were considered to be correct,
r(12)¼ 0.66, P< 0.05: larger (i.e. more negative) MFN amp-
litudes were associated with a narrower critical interval
(Figure 7). Since the size of this critical interval was dynam-
ically adjusted to the participant’s performance by reducing
the size of the interval after correct responses, this interval
size can be considered a direct measure for performance
Fig. 6 (A) Topographical distributions of the three extracted principal components. Note that only component 2 has the spatial distribution associated with the MFN. (B) Spatial
factor scores for subjects in the high (n¼ 12) and low (n¼ 12) status groups, confirming a more pronounced difference in factor scores of principal component 2 (220–320 ms)
between positive and negative feedback for low-status subjects, compared to high-status subjects. (C) Associated ‘difference waves’ of factor scores, created by subtracting
loadings associated with positive feedback from those associated with negative feedback, for subjects with low (n¼ 12), middle (n¼ 12) and high (n¼ 12) status.
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accuracy. Therefore, the observed correlation indicates that
MFN amplitudes in low-status subjects are related to more
accurate performance in these subjects. This correlation was
not observed for subjects with middle or high status,
r(12) < 0.27, NS. Similar effects were observed on FCz, and
also for PCA component 2, r(12)¼ 0.68, P< 0.05, but not for
the other components, r(12) < 0.34, NS.
In contrast, for high-status subjects we found that on Cz,
their MFN difference wave amplitudes were related to their
scores on reward sensitivity [BAS; r(12)¼0.79, P< 0.005]:
for high-status subjects, the difference in ERP amplitudes
elicited by gains and losses was associated with how much
these subjects were motivated by rewards: high-status sub-
jects who were highly motivated by rewards displayed rela-
tively large (i.e. more negative) MFNs when they found out
that they lost money, compared with trials in which they
gained money (Figure 7), while for high-status subjects
who were less sensitive to rewards, this difference in ERP
amplitudes between gains and losses was less pronounced.
This correlation was observed for the subscales BAS-Drive
and BAS-Reward [r(12) > 0.76, P< 0.005], but not for
BAS-Fun Seeking [r(12)¼ 0.05, NS]. Similar effects of BAS
in the high-status group were observed on Pz, while the
effect on PCA component 2 just failed to reach significance,
r(12)¼ 0.55, P¼ 0.06. These correlations with reward sensi-
tivity were not observed for low-status subjects, while for
middle-status subjects, the only significant correlation was
between MFN amplitude on Cz and BAS-Drive,
r(12)¼0.61, P< 0.05. All other correlations were found
to be non-significant.
DISCUSSION
It has been proposed that people with low status are more
likely to experience social evaluative threat and are therefore
more inclined to monitor for these threats and inhibit ap-
proach behaviour. Therefore, we expected that, particularly
in a hierarchical social context, low-status individuals would
be more engaged in evaluating their own performance.
This is indeed what we observed in the present experiment:
MFN for low-status participants was found to be of
significantly larger amplitude compared with both middle-
and high-status participants. Importantly, by isolating the
spatial component that corresponds to the MFN, our PCA
analysis showed that the observed effects were unlikely to
have been caused by temporally coinciding activity unrelated
to MFN. Nevertheless, the reported negativity is somewhat
more posterior, peaking at Cz, than would have been
expected from a MFN, which is important to take into ac-
count when comparing the present results with other find-
ings on MFN.
We have argued that MFN amplitudes are most depend-
ent on how concerned subjects are over making mistakes,
especially in a social context. Indeed, we have recently found
that being treated unfairly (receiving low offers in an ulti-
matum game; Boksem and De Cremer, 2010), viewing dis-
approving facial expressions (Boksem et al., 2011b), as well
as being outperformed by peers (Boksem et al., 2011a), re-
sults in enhanced MFN amplitudes. Therefore, MFN ampli-
tude may reflect how engaged subjects are in processing cues
that indicate possible threats to their standing in the social
group (see Tops and Boksem, 2010). Because of the import-
ance of social ties and the belongingness to a group for our
well-being and even survival, it is imperative to be able to
detect one’s acceptance within, or rejection from, the social
group. In social animals such as humans, the neural system
involved in performance evaluation and the detection of
errors, losses, threats and punishments (as reflected by the
MFN), may be particularly involved in processing errors and
threats of a social nature of which potential social exclusion
may be a very prominent one. Indeed, also the ACC (the
putative source of the MFN) has been shown to be involved
in processing ‘error’ signals from the social environment
such as potential loss of social resources, exclusion and
rejection (e.g. Eisenberger et al., 2003).
Fig. 7 Scatter plots of the correlation between MFN amplitude (Cz) and performance for low-status subjects [r(12)¼ 0.66; A], and the correlation between MFN amplitude (Cz)
and BAS scores for high-status subjects [r(12)¼0.61; B].
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Particularly for individuals already at the bottom of the
social ladder, the threat of negative evaluation and potential
exclusion by their peers may loom large (Anderson and
Berdahl, 2002). Therefore, it makes adaptive sense for
these individuals to put more effort into evaluating their
own performance and more actively monitor for (social)
errors than would be necessary for individuals enjoying a
higher status. The enhanced MFN amplitudes for low-status
participants reported here strongly support such an
interpretation.
Moreover, especially for low-status individuals, these error
signals of negative social evaluation should provide a motiv-
ational cue to change behaviour in such a way that their
performance will be more positively evaluated by others in
the future, to prevent further loss of status and potential
exclusion. Indeed, we found that MFN amplitudes were
positively related to performance of low-status subjects
only. These findings fit well with one of the most prominent
theories on the MFN, which states that the MFN reflects the
activity of a system for reinforcement learning (Holroyd and
Coles, 2002). The reinforcement learning theory of the MFN
holds that this system utilizes information from the envir-
onment indicating success or failure, in order to adjust be-
haviour in such a way that it better correspond to the set
goals. Recently, it was shown that, when subjects received
negative feedback for a certain action, MFN amplitude was
larger when behaviour is subsequently successfully adjusted
(i.e. when subjects have learned from the feedback), com-
pared with when the incorrect response is repeated after
negative feedback, (i.e. subjects have not learned from the
feedback; Van der Helden et al., 2010). The present data
suggest that, while high-status subjects used feedback to de-
termine whether they received rewards (MFN was related to
BAS scores), low-status subjects used the information pro-
vided by the feedback to adjust performance: for these
subjects, MFN amplitudes were positively related to
performance. However, because these findings are based on
between-subject correlations, and do not show trial-by-trial
associations, they have to be interpreted with caution.
Two important potential confound need to be addressed
here. First, because low-status subjects have experienced a lot
of negative feedback during the rank inducing session, they
may have become increasingly despondent, possibly result-
ing in depressed mood and anxiety. Indeed, the MFN has
previously been found to be enlarged for subjects with high
levels of negative affect (Luu et al., 2000; Hajcak et al., 2004),
depression (Chiu and Deldin, 2007) and anxiety (Hajcak
et al., 2003). However, in the present experimental session,
subjects in all status groups received equal numbers of posi-
tive and negative feedback, affecting mood similarly in all
subjects. Still, possible carry-over effects of mood from the
rank inducing session cannot be excluded. Second, because
the status groups are generated by changing the difficulty
and thus the frequency of reinforcement in the three
groups, this may result in different reward expectations for
subjects in the different status groups, which may also ex-
plain the observed differences in MFN amplitude. For ex-
ample, Holroyd et al. (2003) found that unexpected negative
feedback elicited the largest MFN, while Oliveira et al. (2007)
showed that also unexpected positive feedback may lead to
larger MFN amplitudes. Thus, unexpectedness may be
related to increased MFN amplitudes. In addition to the
fact that these expectancy effects are not always observed
(e.g. Hajcak et al., 2007), in our experiment, especially for
subjects in the high-status group, who, because they experi-
enced few instances of negative reinforcement in the
rank-inducing session, negative feedback should be particu-
larly unexpected. However, these subjects actually showed
the smallest MFN amplitudes, while subjects in the
low-status group, who had experienced many instances of
negative feedback in the rank-inducing session, displayed the
largest amplitudes. In addition, any effects of expectancy on
MFN amplitudes can be considered to be relatively
short-lived because frequencies of positive and negative feed-
back were equal for all subjects in the experimental session.
Therefore, alternative explanations of the observed effects in
terms of expectancy seem unlikely.
The present findings suggest that low-status subjects
monitor their performance more actively, and adjust
their behaviour more effectively when they receive informa-
tion that current performance is below par. This, however,
appears to be in stark contrast with suggestions in the litera-
ture that low status and low power may impair execu-
tive functions and goal-directed behaviour (e.g. Guinote,
2007; Smith et al., 2008). High power individuals have
been shown to have a greater capacity for maintenance of
self-set goals and are better able to keep these goals at the
focus of their attention, while low power individuals are
more guided by situational constraints and have difficulties
inhibiting goal-irrelevant information (Overbeck and Park,
2006).
We have suggested previously (Boksem et al., 2011) that
this paradox may be resolved by proposing that differences
in status may involve differential activation of two separate
neural control pathways that project from limbic areas in the
brain to the prefrontal cortex (Tucker and Williamson, 1984;
Corbetta and Shulman, 2002: Braver et al., 2007). The first,
mediodorsal pathway projects to the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and is involved in planning, goal-directed behaviour,
and applying top-down control over selection of stimuli
from the environment. Conversely, a second, ventrolateral
pathway projects to the orbitofrontal cortex and ventral pre-
frontal cortex and is more sensitive to external cues and is
specialized in detecting salient unexpected events in the en-
vironment. Importantly, the ‘dorsal’ control system is con-
sidered to be proactive in that it is engaged when behaviour
follows a predetermined action plan, while the ‘ventral’
system is considered to be reactive, interrupting dorsal
goal-directed behaviour when events in the environment
call for a change of plans.
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We suggest that high-status individuals may rely more on
the proactive dorsal control system, stimulating approach
and goal-directed behaviour, while the behaviour of
low-status individuals is regulated more by the reactive ven-
tral system, which down-regulates approach and is sensitive
to salient external events (such as negative performance feed-
back), making them better equipped to monitor and adjust
their performance, but on the downside, may also leave them
unable to inhibit distracting information from the environ-
ment (see Eysenck et al., 2007 for a similar reasoning on the
effects of anxiety on attentional control processes). This
would make adaptive sense: being relatively unconstrained,
high-status individuals are in a position to act in accordance
with predetermined plans, while low-status individuals con-
tinuously have to monitor their unpredictable environment
for unexpected changes and cues that may signal possible
social exclusion and rejection by higher status individuals
(which as a by-product may induce over-detection of stimuli
from the environment that are deemed relevant, resulting in
increased distractibility). Therefore, low status most likely
does not impair executive control, but rather it is associated
with a more reactive mode of behavioural control that is
actually more adaptive for those low in status.
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